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The first shot in the "second civil war" was fired in the North,
at the state house in Trenton, New Jersey. In 1973, the New Jersey
General Assembly enacted legislation that forbade the importation
of any solid waste generated outside of the state.' The problem of
garbage disposal reached crisis proportions in the United States in
the 1980s due to the massive industrialization of the twentieth cen-
tury. The increased consumption of products and pace of living en-
couraged society to rely on prepackaged, single-use, disposable
commodities.
As the volume of solid waste produced by the citizens of the
United States increased, man's knowledge of the widespread public
health, safety, and environmental problems caused by burying solid
waste in landfills has also increased. The federal government has ag-
gressively sought to minimize. the dangers created by hazardous
wastes, although it has not adequately addressed the nonhazardous
waste disposal crisis through legislation or regulation.2 In order to
protect public health and safety, many states have attempted to fill
the void created by federal inaction and have imposed strict limita-
tions on the methods of solid waste management and the volume of
solid waste that can be disposed of in those states.' In their zeal to
protect public health and safety, however, some states have enacted
legislation designed to isolate the state from the solid waste manage-
* The author is Assistant Counsel in the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Re-
sources' Office of Chief Counsel. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources. This article was prepared in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for an LL.M. in Environmental Law at the National Law Center of George Washington
University.
I. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1311-10 (Repealed 1981).
2. Although the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") autho-
rizes the federal government to regulate solid waste management and includes provisions ad-
dressing state and regional solid waste planning, the primary focus of the Act is on the man-
agement of hazardous waste, and the federal government has not taken an active role in the
regulation of non-hazardous waste. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k (1976 & Supp. 1989).
3. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 13.29(1)-.29(36) (1987); R.I. GEN.LAWS § 23-19-
13.1 (1989).
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ment crisis shared in common by all of the states." Protectionist leg-
islation, such as the New Jersey solid waste import ban,5 often im-
poses unconstitutional burdens on the interstate flow of commerce.'
II. Solid Waste Becomes an Article of Interstate Commerce
In the 1987 landmark case, City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey,' the United States Supreme Court struck down as unconsti-
tutional New Jersey's solid waste import ban. In City of Philadel-
phia, the Court held that solid waste may be an article of interstate
commerce. Therefore, state regulation of the interstate flow of solid
waste must be consistent with the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution.' The Court held that New Jersey's ban on the
importation of all solid waste into the state unconstitutionally inter-
fered with interstate commerce. 9 Further, the Court clarified that
states retain the authority to regulate solid waste management activ-
ities affecting interstate commerce but not violating the commerce
clause. 10 Finally, the Court identified the standard for measuring the
constitutional validity of such state regulation.11
Many state officials failed to learn the lesson taught in City of
Philadelphia and instead implemented regulatory schemes almost
identical to the scheme struck down by the Court in that case. For
instance, in 1987, the Governor of West Virginia issued an Executive
4. See, e.g., W. Va. Exec. Order No. 6-87 (1987), reprinted in Industrial Maintenance
Serv., Inc. v. Moore, 677 F. Supp. 436, 437 n.l (S.D. W. Va. 1987).
5. See supra note I and accompanying text.
6. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Industrial Maintenance
Serv., Inc. v. Moore, 677 F. Supp. 436 (S.D. W. Va. 1987).
7. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
8. Id. at 629.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 623.
11. Id. at 624. According to the City of Philadelphia court, "where [state action] regu-
lates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Id. at 624 (citing Pike v. Bruce
Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). However, the City of Philadelphia court established a
more stringent standard of review, a "virtually per se rule of invalidity" for purely protection-
ist state action. Id. at 624. The Court has tempered that standard in the years following its
decision. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
Since Congress has the Constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce, U.S.
CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, it is possible that Congress may render moot through federal legisla-
tion many of the questions regarding permissible state limits on waste imports. In that regard,
Ohio Representative Thomas Lukens has recently proposed legislation to reauthorize RCRA,
which includes a provision that specifically authorizes states to ban solid waste imports if cer-
tain conditions are met. H.R. 3735, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(a) (1989).
Similar legislation was introudced in the Senate by Senators Dan Coats and Mitch Mc-
Connell as an amendment to the fiscal 1991 District of Columbia appropriations bill. H.R.
5311, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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Order that deprived the State Department of Natural Resources of
the authority to confirm, license, or renew a license, or to encourage
in any manner the disposition in West Virginia of solid waste other
than that generated by the citizens of West Virginia themselves. 2
Not surprisingly, the Executive Order was struck down by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of West Vir-
ginia."3 In general, state regulatory schemes banning the importation
of solid waste generated outside of a state that allows the disposal of
the same type of solid waste generated within the state have been
struck down by the lower federal courts as unconstitutional."4
City of Philadelphia demonstrated to the states, however, that
there are methods of state regulation of solid waste management
that affect interstate commerce but do not violate the commerce
clause.'5 The reasoning underlying subsequent commerce clause
cases suggests even further regulatory schemes available to states be-
yond the schemes suggested by the Court in City of Philadelphia.'6
Many of the regulatory schemes affecting interstate commerce have
12. W. Va. Executive Order No. 6-87 (1987), reprinted in Industrial Maintenance
Serv., Inc. v. Moore, 677 F. Supp. 436, 437 n.l (S.D. W. Va. 1987).
13. Industrial Maintenance Serv., 677 F. Supp. at 444.
14. Id. at 443. See National Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl.
Management, No. 90-7047 (11 th Cir. Aug. 8, 1990) (Alabama law prohibiting the disposal in
Alabama of hazardous waste generated in states that prohibit the disposal of hazardous waste
within their borders or in states that do not provide for hazardous waste treatment or disposal
capacity as required by the Federal Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation
and Liability Act held to violate the commerce clause); Washington State Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, AFL-CIO v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 913 (1982) (Washington law prohibiting the transportation and storage of radioactive
waste in the state if the waste was generated outside of the state held to violate the commerce
clause).
15. The Court suggested that New Jersey could slow the flow of all waste into the state's
landfills without unconstitutionally interfering with interstate commerce. City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978). The Court also suggested that its decision might not
apply in cases in which the state or local government acts as a market participant rather than
a market regulator. Id. at 627, n.6. The market participant exception to the commerce clause
was established by the Supreme Court in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794,
805-10 (1976).
The lower federal courts have generally upheld state or local solid waste management
schemes involving the state or local government as a market participant. See, e.g., Swin Re-
source Systems v. Lycoming County, 678 F. Supp. 1116 (M.D. Pa. 1988), af'd, 883 F.2d 245
(3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1127, 107 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1990) (county-imposed vol-
ume restrictions and tipping fees for disposal at the county-operated landfill upheld under the
market participant doctrine); LeFrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987)
(state prohibition on disposal of solid waste generated out-of-state at a state-subsidized sani-
tary landfill upheld under the market participant doctrine); and Shyane Bros., Inc. v. District
of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D,C. 1984) (court upheld a District of Columbia health
regulation prohibiting the disposal of solid waste generated outside of the city in disposal facil-
ities operated by the District without approval).
16. The Supreme Court's decisions in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S.
941 (1982) and Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) widen a state's latitude in imposing
restrictions on the interstate flow of solid waste that do not violate the commerce clause.
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been upheld by the lower federal courts, even though the schemes
have a greater impact on out-of-state waste than waste produced
within a state. 7
Determining whether state regulation of solid waste manage-
ment unconstitutionally interferes with interstate commerce is a deli-
cate determination, based upon a balancing of interests with each
scheme evaluated on its own merits. Protectionist schemes, such as
those struck down in City of Philadelphia, are likely to be held un-
constitutional. States are, however, able to take measures to regulate
solid waste that protect the public health, safety, welfare and the
environment and still continue to recognize the role of the state in
the brotherhood of the federal system. Pennsylvania Governor Rob-
ert Casey's Executive Order 1989-88 exemplifies one such
measure.'
9
II. Pennsylvania's Regulation of Municipal Waste and Executive
Order 1989-8
A. Legislative Action
The purpose and effect of Executive Order 1989-8 can only be
fully understood when considered within the framework of Pennsyl-
vania's comprehensive municipal waste management program.
Under Pennsylvania's Solid Waste Management Act,2" a person may
neither own nor operate facilities to process or dispose of municipal
waste in Pennsylvania without a permit from the Commonwealth's
Department of Environmental Resources ("DER"). Furthermore,
one may not process, collect, transport, store, or dispose of municipal
17. See, e.g., Bill Kettle Well Excavating v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 732
F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (Michigan law prohibting the disposal of solid waste gener-
ated outside of a county in a landfill in the county unless the disposal is authorized in the
county's solid waste management plan upheld against a commerce clause challenge); Ever-
green Waste Sys., Inc. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987) (municipal-
ity's prohibition on the disposal of waste generated outside of a three county district in the
municipality's landfill upheld against a commerce clause challenge); Waste Aid Systems, Inc.
v. Citrus County, Fla., 613 F. Supp. 102 (M.D. Fla. 1985) (county's prohibition on disposal of
waste generated outside of the county in a landfill within the county upheld against a com-
merce clause challenge); Harvey and Harvey v. Delaware Solid Waste Auth., 600 F. Supp.
1369 (D. Del. 1985) (state regulation requiring that solid waste collected in a county must be
disposed of in that county upheld against a commerce clause challenge); Al Turi Landfill, Inc.
v. Town of Goshen, 556 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 697 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1982)
(town ordinance setting a cumulative size limitation of 300 acres for all existing and closed
landfills in the town, limiting the size of each individual facility to 50 acres held to be a
constitutional measure to protect public health and the environment).
18. 19 Pa. Bull. 4598 (codified at 4 PA. CODE § 7.471-7.476 (1990)).
19. See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6018.101-6018.1003 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1989).
BEYOND CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
waste in Pennsylvania except in accordance with DER regulations.2
The Commonwealth promulgated stringent municipal waste regula-
tions that became effective on April 9, 1988.22 Designed to protect
the public health, safety, welfare, and the environment from the dan-
gers of managing the total volume of municipal waste that is man-
aged in the Commonwealth, these regulations apply uniformly to the
management of all municipal waste in Pennsylvania, regardless of
whether the municipal waste is generated in Pennsylvania or
elsewhere.
In addition, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Municipal
Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction Act2 3 to reduce
the volume of municipal waste generated within Pennsylvania,
thereby reducing the volume of municipal waste to be disposed of in
the state. The Act requires Pennsylvania municipalities to establish
mandatory recycling programs through ordinances or regulations.24
The Act also declares that at least 25% of all municipal waste and
source separated recyclable materials able to be separated by source
generated within the Commonwealth on or after January 1, 1997
should be recycled.25
21. Id. § 6018.201(a). The Act defines "municipal waste" as "any garbage, refuse, in-
dustrial lunchroom or office waste and other material including solid, liquid, semisolid, or con-
tained gaseous material resulting from operation of residential, municipal, commercial or insti-
tutional establishments and from community activities . . ." Id. § 6-18.103.
22. 18 Pa. Bull. 1681 (codified at 25 PA. CODE §§ 271.1-285.222 (1988)). These regula-
tions require that municipal waste landfills be constructed with double liners, a leachate detec-
tion zone, and a leachate collection system. 25 PA. CODE §§ 273.251-273.258 (1988). They
require landfill operators to conduct groundwater and surface water monitoring at the facility,
id. §§ 273.281-273.288, and impose restrictions on the siting of municipal waste landfills in
certain areas, such as flood plains and wetlands. Id. § 273.202. The regulations also limit the
types of wastes that can be disposed of in the facility. Id. §§ 273.201(d)-(g). Additionally, the
regulations establish strict standards governing the storage, collection, and transportation of
municipal waste, id. §§ 285.101-285.222, composting of municipal waste, id. §§ 281.1-
281.282, processing of municipal waste, id. §§ 283.1-283.403, and land application of sewage
sludge. Id. §§ 275.1-275.614.
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 §§ 4000.101-4000.1904 (Purdon 1970 & Supp. 1989).
24. Id. § 4000.1501.
25. Id. § 4000.102(c)(1). The Act includes a variety of provisions to accomplish this
goal. For example, under the Act, counties are required to establish a 10 year municipal waste
management plan that describes how the waste generated within the county during the 10 year
period will be managed. Id. §§ 4000.501-4000.502. DER may not issue municipal waste
processing or disposal permits to facilities that are not provided for in municipal waste man-
agement plans unless certain conditions are met. Id. § 4000.507. Municipalities are required to
establish a program for the collection and composting of leaf waste as part of the mandatory
recycling program required by the Act, and truckloads of leaf waste may not be disposed of at
municipal waste landfills within two years after the effective date of the Act. Id. §
4000.1502(a). The Act also requires operators of resource recovery facilities to remove recycl-
able materials from the waste to be incinerated at the resource recovery facility to the greatest
extent practicable, id. § 4000.1502(c), and requires operators of municipal waste landfills,
resource recovery facilities, and transfer stations to establish drop-off centers for recyclable
materials. Id. § 4000.1502(b). In addition, the Act requires Commonwealth agencies, includ-
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To encourage reusing materials and to reduce the volume of
waste to be disposed of within the Commonwealth, in 1989, the
Pennsylvania General Assembly amended the Solid Waste Manage-
ment Act. This change encouraged the beneficial use of certain mu-
nicipal and residual wastes.2" The amendments to the Solid Waste
Management Act also enabled DER to issue general permits for the
beneficial use or exclusion of those wastes from the strict bonding
and insurance requirements that generally apply to processing and
disposal of solid waste.27
Pennsylvania's Solid Waste Management Act, Municipal Waste
Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction Act, and the regulations
promulgated pursuant to those laws, are geared toward protecting
the public health and safety and toward preserving natural resources
within the Commonwealth. Pennsylvania's Constitution declares
that:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic values
of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources are
the common property of all the people, including generations yet
to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.2 8
B. Increased Solid Waste Imports
Pennsylvania's Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and
Waste Reduction Act, the Solid Waste Management Act and the
regulations promulgated pursuant to those laws2" encouraged a re-
duction in the volume of municipal waste generated within the Com-
monwealth. These Acts and regulations also encouraged a reduction
in the amount of landfill space and processing capacity required for
the disposal of waste generated within Pennsylvania. It became ap-
parent, however, that those measures failed to address the problems
created by an influx of waste generated outside of Pennsylvania.
ing the Department of General Services, to reduce waste, id. § 4000.1503(b), establish a
source separation and collection program, and procure recycled materials. Id. § 4000.1511,
4000.1504, 4000.1505.
26. 1989 Pa. Laws 1989-55. "Beneficial use" of a waste is defined by the amendments to
the Solid Waste Management Act as the use or reuse of a waste when the use does not harm
or threaten public health, safety, welfare or the environment. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §
6018.103 (Supp. 1990). This could include, for example, application of certain types of wastes
as fertilizers or the use of a waste as a construction material or road de-icer.
27. PA, STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6018.104(18) (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1989).
28. PA, CONST. art. 1, § 27.
29. 25 PA, CODE §§ 271-85 (1988).
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Even before Governor Casey issued Executive Order 1989-8, statis-
tics compiled by DER indicated that there was a substantial increase
in the rate of waste imports into the Commonwealth." Landfills in
neighboring states were quickly reaching their capacity and were be-
ing closed, threatening the Commonwealth's comprehensive efforts to
preserve its natural resources.' Furthermore, the Federal Ocean
Dumping Ban Act of 198832 required municipalities in New York
and New Jersey to cease dumping millions of tons of sewage sludge
into the ocean33 and to implement land based sludge management
alternatives by December 31, 1991.31
Thus, as Pennsylvania began to effectively remedy the state's
own waste problems, the laws and policies of neighboring states en-
couraged the citizens of those states to dispose of municipal waste in
other states, including Pennsylvania. Without further limitations on
use, Pennsylvania's laws and regulations would merely create more
disposal and processing capacity for outside wastes and less capacity
for wastes generated within Pennsylvania. Instead of reducing the
public health, safety, and environmental hazards to citizens of the
Commonwealth and preserving Pennsylvania's public natural re-
sources, the stringent limitations imposed on Pennsylvanians by the
Pennsylvania solid waste laws and regulations would only change the
origin of the waste disposed of or processed in Pennsylvania. At the
same time, these limitations would reduce the public health, safety,
and environmental hazards to citizens of neighboring states and pre-
serve their natural resources at the expense of Pennsylvania's citi-
zens and natural resources.
To reduce the volume of municipal waste disposed of in Penn-
sylvania landfills and to assure long-term municipal waste disposal
capacity to serve the needs of Pennsylvania, on October 17, 1989
Governor Casey signed Executive Order 1989-8." 5 The Executive
Order placed several restrictions on DER's authority to issue permits
to municipal waste processing and disposal facilities.36 Further, the
Order directed DER to adopt a statewide municipal waste manage-
30. 19 Pa. Bull. 4598, 4599 (1989).
31. Id.
32. 33 US.CA. §§ 1414a-c, 1415 (Supp. 1990).
33. The legislative history of the Ocean Dumping Ban Act indicates that nine New York
and New Jersey municipalities were disposing of 7.7 million wet tons of sewage sludge per
year in the Atlantic Ocean at the time of the Act. S. REP. No. 431, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 15,
reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5867, 5881.
34. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1414b(a)(l)(B) (Supp. 1990).
35. 19 Pa. Bull. 4598 (codified at 4 PA. CODE §§ 7.471-7.476 (1990)).
36. 4 PA. CODE §§ 7.471-7.476 (1990).
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ment plan. 7 The restrictions in the Executive Order on DER's per-
mitting authority are intended to prevent uncontrolled increases in
the volume of municipal waste imported into Pennsylvania while
DER prepares and adopts a solution to the problem. a8
The central provision of the Executive Order is a temporary
moratorium on the issuance of permits for new municipal waste
landfills or resource recovery facilities.3 9 Until DER adopts the state-
wide municipal waste management plan required by the Executive
Order, the agency is directed to cease reviewing applications or issu-
ing new permits for new municipal waste landfills or resource recov-
ery facilities unless the applicant demonstrates a need for additional
municipal waste disposal capacity and shows that at least 70% of
the municipal waste proposed to be received at the facility is gener-
ated within Pennsylvania. 0 The. Executive Order also directs DER
not to issue permit modifications for the disposal of sewage sludge
from any source at municipal waste landfills, unless the permit modi-
fication is necessary for compliance with an order issued by the De-
partment.41 The final major provision of the Executive Order re-
quires immediate DER action to establish maximum and average
waste volume limitations for each operating municipal waste landfill
in Pennsylvania based upon the actual daily volume of waste dis-
posed of at the landfill.
42
Because the Executive Order will affect the interstate flow of
waste, it has been suggested that its restrictions are unconstitutional
violations of the commerce clause. The following sections describe
the method of analysis employed by the Supreme Court in determin-
ing whether state regulation of natural resources to protect public
health and safety violates the commerce clause. This article will also
illustrate the constitutionality of Executive Order 1989-8 in light of
the commerce clause.
37. Id. § 7.473. That provision directs DER to develop a proposed plan by September
26, 1991. Id.
38. Id. § 7,471.
39. Id. A "resource recovery facility" is defined by the Municipal Waste Planning, Re-
cycling and Waste Reduction Act to be
[A] processing facility that provides for the extraction and utilization of
materials or energy from municipal waste that is generated offsite, including, but
not limited to, a facility that mechanically extracts materials from municipal
waste, a combustion facility that converts the organic fraction of municipal
waste to usable energy, and any chemical or biological process that converts
municipal waste into a fuel product.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 4000.103 (Supp. 1989).
40. 4 PA. CODE § 7.471(a) (1990).
41. Id. § 7.471(b).
42. Id. § 7.472(a).
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IV. The Commerce Clause and Protection of Natural Resources
A. The Supreme Court Voices its Position
The commerce clause in the United States Constitution 43 allows
Congress to regulate commerce between and among the states. In
the absence of federal legislation, however, states retain the author-
ity to impose restrictions on state activities, even interstate com-
merce, as long as the restrictions are within certain restraints.44 The
restraints that the "dormant" commerce clause imposes on state reg-
ulation of interstate commerce are not described in the Constitution
itself; instead, they have been developed by the Supreme Court in
decisions implementing the commerce clause. A significant number
of these decisions regarding the dormant commerce clause and state
regulation of interstate commerce addressed state authority to enact
measures to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the
state's natural resources.4 5 The Supreme Court's analysis when faced
with state regulation of commerce has evolved radically over the past
century.
An early yet significant case that addressed the commerce
clause implications of state regulation of natural resources was Geer
v. State of Connecticut.46 Geer analyzed the validity of a Connecti-
cut statute that allowed persons to kill woodcock, ruffled grouse, and
quail, and to transport those birds as long as they remained in the
state. These same activities, however, were prohibited if the birds
were to be transported out of the state. 41 Valid law for three-
43. See supra note 6.
44. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978).
45. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (Maine law protecting the health of the
state's baitfish and the state's aquatic environment held not to unconstitutionally interfere with
interstate commerce); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex ret. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (Nebraska
regulations protecting the state's limited supply of groundwater held, in part, to unconstitu-
tionally interfere with interstate commerce); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979)
(Oklahoma law protecting the ecological balance of the state's aquatic environment by limiting
the withdrawal of minnows from the waters of the state held to unconstitutionally interfere
with interstate commerce); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (New
Jersey law protecting public health and safety by conserving landfill space held to unconstitu-
tionally interfere with interstate commerce); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553
(1923) (West Virginia law protecting the state's limited supply of natural gas held to unconsti-
tutionally interfere with interstate commerce); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229
(1911) (Oklahoma law protecting the state's limited supply of natural gas held to unconstitu-
tionally interfere with interstate commerce); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896) (Con-
necticut law protecting the ecological balance of the state's environment by limiting the with-
drawal of game birds from the environment held to unconstitutionally interfere with interstate
commerce).
46. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
47. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2530 (1888). Specifically, the law made it a crime for any
person to "kill any woodcock, ruffled grouse or quail for the purpose of conveying the same
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quarters of a century, the Geer court decision was that wild animals
and fish within a state arc owned by the state in its sovereign capac-
ity, for the common benefit of all of the people of the state.4" The
Court reasoned that state ownership of animals, coupled with state
police power to preserve a valuable food supply for its citizens, au-
thorized the state to regulate the taking, subsequent use, and prop-
erty rights that may be acquired in wild animals or fish.4" Further,
the Court viewed the Connecticut statute as a limitation on the abil-
ity of Connecticut citizens to acquire property rights in certain wild
animals consistent with that authority.5" More importantly, however,
the Geer court held that because Connecticut law limited the trans-
port of woodcock, ruffled grouse, or quail out of the state, the statute
created only internal commerce in the animals, and not interstate
commerce. 1 Thus, the Court opined, the Connecticut law did not
interfere with interstate commerce. 2
The Supreme Court was reluctant to extend the Geer rationale
beyond state regulation of wild animals. In West v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co.,5" the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to an
Oklahoma statute that forbade the construction or use of natural gas
pipelines if the pipelines were to be used to transport natural gas out
of the state.54 Relying upon the Supreme Court's holding in Geer,
Oklahoma argued that its statute was aimed at conserving the natu-
ral resources of the state and was within the state's police power. 5
By limiting the transportation of natural gas to transportation within
the state, Oklahoma argued, the statute created only internal com-
merce in natural gas and did not create or interfere with interstate
commerce.5" According to Oklahoma, the challenged statute would
only indirectly affect interstate commerce.57
The Supreme Court disagreed, however, and refused to apply its
ruling in Geer to the facts of West.5" In rejecting Oklahoma's argu-
ment that the purpose of its statute was conservation of a natural
beyond the limits of the state; or . . .transport or have in possession, with intention to procure
the transportation beyond said limits, of any such birds killed within the state." Id.
48. 161 U.S. at 529.
49. Id. at 535.
50. Id. at 529.
51. Id. at 530-31.
52. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
53. 221 U.S. 229 (1911).




58. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 253 (1911).
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resource, the Court held that the statute was actually a commercial
statute aimed at protecting the business welfare of the state." The
Supreme Court further rejected Oklahoma's argument that the stat-
ute in question affected interstate commerce only indirectly. The
Court stated that:
If the states have such a power, a singular situation might
result. Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its tim-
ber, the mining states their minerals. Any why may not the
products of the field be brought within the principle? . . .
[E]mbargo may be retaliated by embargo, and commerce will
be halted at state lines.
60
Holding that "no state can by action or inaction prevent, unreasona-
bly burden, discriminate against or directly regulate interstate com-
merce or the right to carry it on,"'" the Court struck down the
Oklahoma statute as unconstitutional.
A decade later, the Supreme Court addressed a situation similar
to that in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia.2 The case involved a chal-
lenge to a West Virginia law requiring companies extracting natural
gas from wells in West Virginia to give preference to state interests
in distribution. 3 West Virginia argued that its statute constituted a
valid exercise of police power and affected interstate commerce only
incidentally.6 " The Court, however, rejected that argument citing its
decision in West. Instead, the Court held that West Virginia's law
constituted a prohibited interference with interstate commerce.6 5 The
Court's in West v. Kansas Natural Gas and Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia refused to view the statutes in those cases as true conserva-
tion or public health and safety statutes. For this reason, neither case
specified the amount of state interference with interstate commerce
that would be tolerated to accomplish conservation or public health
and safety goals.
Although these cases were important in the early development
of dormant commerce clause analysis, they are no longer valid be-
59. Id. at 255.
60. Id. at 255-56.
61. Id. at 261.
62. 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
63. Id. at 595.
64. Id. at 577-78.
65. Id. at 596-97. In the words of the Court, "Natural gas is a lawful article of com-
merce and its transmission from one state to another for sale and consumption in the latter
state is interstate commerce. A state law . . . which by its necessary operation prevents, ob-
structs or burdens such transmission is a regulation of interstate commerce - a prohibited
interference." Id.
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cause many changes have occurred in the seventy-five years since
they were decided.
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause Test
The modern dormant commerce clause analysis involves a two-
part test, articulated by the Supreme Court in City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey.66 The two-part test employed by the Court illustrates
an "alertness to the evils of 'economic isolation' and protectionism,
while at the same time recognizing that incidental burdens on inter-
state commerce may be unavoidable when a state legislates to safe-
guard the health and safety of its people.16 7 As the City of Philadel-
phia Court described the analysis, "where simple economic
protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of
invalidity has been erected.68 Further, the Court stressed that the
"per se rule" applied if a state statute discriminated against out-of-
state interests in either purpose or effect. 9 On the other hand, when
a state's actions do not affirmatively discriminate against out-of-state
interests in favor of in-state interests, the Court explained that it
applies a balancing test first set down in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.7
Under the balancing test, "[w]here the statute regulates evenhand-
edly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits." 71 Thus, to prevail under the Pike test, a
challenger to a statute must show: (1) that the statute is not even-
handed, (2) that there is no legitimate local public interest, or (3)
that the burden imposed on interstate commerce by the statute is not
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
Since the Court in City of Philadelphia viewed the New Jersey
statute as patently discriminatory, the Court applied its per se rule
and determined the statute to be unconstitutional. 72 For this reason,
the court neither explored nor addressed the extent of state interfer-
66. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
67. 437 U.S. at 623-24.
68. Id. at 624.
69. Id. at 626. The Court explained that "the evil of protectionism can reside in legisla-
tive means as well as legislative ends." Id.
70. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
71. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978), citing Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
72. 437 U.S. at 628. The Court held that "[tihe New Jersey law at issue in this case
falls squarely within the area that the Commerce Clause puts off limits to state regulation. On
its face, it imposes on out-of-state interests the full burden of conserving the state's remaining
landfill space." Id.
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ence in interstate commerce that would be justifiable under the Pike
balancing test as necessary to accomplish conservation and public
health and safety goals.
In dicta, the Supreme Court suggested two ways that a state
might regulate or influence interstate commerce in solid waste with-
out violating the commerce clause.73 One solution proposed that New
Jersey slow the flow of all waste into state landfills to preserve the
landfill space."4 With this suggestion, however, interstate commerce
may be incidentally affected. A second suggestion left open the pos-
sibility that New Jersey could accomplish its goals by becoming a
market participant rather than a market regulator. 75 These sugges-
tions, however, are not the only options available to states in the reg-
ulation of solid waste in interstate commerce. For example, subse-
quent case law 76 refining the two-part dormant commerce clause
analysis suggests alternatives beyond those mentioned in City of
Philadelphia.
In the year following the Supreme Court's decision in City of
Philadelphia, the Court decided another dormant commerce clause
case involving a state's attempts to protect its natural resources.
Hughes v. Oklahoma" centered on an Oklahoma statute banning
the transportation of minnows out of Oklahoma if the minnows were
seined or procured within Oklahoma. 7 At the time of Hughes, the
Supreme Court had not overruled its decision in Geer v. Connecti-
cut.79 Oklahoma argued that the statute before the Court was valid
under Geer because of the similarity between the two cases. Rather
than applying the Geer analysis, however, the Hughes Court explic-
itly overruled Geer. 0 Noting that it rejected the Geer analysis in
every case involving natural resources other than wild game, the Su-
preme Court held that state regulation of wild animals should be
reviewed under the same general analysis applied to state regulation
of other natural resources."'
The Hughes Court analyzed the Oklahoma statute under the
two-part test described in City of Philadelphia. Hughes demon-
strates a method of analysis for determining the constitutionality of
73. Id.
74. Id. at 626.
75. Id. at 627 n.6.
76. See infra notes 77-104 and accompanying text.
77. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
78. OKLA. STAT., tit. 29, § 4-115(B) (Supp. 1981).
79. 161 U.S. 519 (1896). See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
80. 441 U.S. at 335.
81. Id.
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discriminatory statutes that City of Philadelphia referred to as per
se invalid. According to Hughes the burden to show that a state stat-
ute is discriminatory rests on the party challenging the validity of
the statute.82 When discrimination against interstate commerce is
demonstrated, however, the state has the burden of showing that
there is a legitimate local purpose for the statute.8 3 Further, the state
must show that there are no adequate non-discriminatory alterna-
tives available to accomplish that legitimate purpose. 4 The Hughes
Court held that Oklahoma's interest in maintaining the ecological
balance in the state's waters by avoiding the removal of inordinate
numbers of minnows could qualify as a legitimate local purpose. Un-
fortunately, there were other adequate non-discriminatory alterna-
tives available that would better accomplish that purpose.8" While
Hughes indicated that conservation of natural resources could be a
legitimate purpose for state regulation interfering with interstate
commerce, it held that the Oklahoma statute could not withstand the
high level of scrutiny applied by the Court to the analysis of discrim-
inatory laws.
C. Recognizing Discriminatory Statutes
The Supreme Court applies different levels of scrutiny when
state laws interfering with interstate commerce are challenged. Dis-
tinctions are drawn depending on whether the law is a discrimina-
tory, protectionist measure, or an evenhanded measure. It is impor-
tant to know the difference between the two types of laws. The
Supreme Court, in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel Douglas,8 6 shed
some light on the factors it considers to determine whether a statute
is discriminatory.
Sporhase discussed the validity of a Nebraska statute relating
to the export of groundwater, which required that:
Any person . . . intending to withdraw groundwater from
any well or pit located in the State of Nebraska and transport it
for use in an adjoining state shall apply to the Department of
Water Resources for a permit to do so.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 336.
84. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979), citing Hunt v. Washington Apple
Advertising Comm'n., 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977). The Supreme Court also stated that it is not
bound by the description or characterization given to the statute by the legislature or the state
courts, but determines for itself the practical import of the law. 441 U.S. at 336, citing
LaCoste v. Louisiana Dep't of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545, 550 (1924).
85. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 338.
86. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
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If the Director of Water Resources finds that the with-
drawal of the groundwater requested is reasonable, is not con-
trary to the conservation and use of groundwater, and is not oth-
erwise detrimental to the public welfare, he shall grant the
permit if the state in which the water is to be used grants recip-
rocal rights to withdraw and transport groundwater from that
state for use in the State of Nebraska.
87
This statute imposed restrictions on the out-of-state use of ground-
water only. The Sporhase court noted, however, that other Nebraska
regulations placed restrictions on the use of groundwater within the
state. The Court used the Pike test88 to analyze the three conditions
of the challenged regulation for withdrawal of groundwater. The
Sporhase court stated that a facial examination of the first three
conditions of the regulation did not indicate that those conditions
impermissibly burdened interstate commerce.8" Further, the Court
noted that, "a state that imposes severe withdrawal and use restric-
tions on its own citizens is not discriminating against interstate com-
merce when it seeks to prevent the uncontrolled transfer of water out
of the state."9 In effect, the Sporhase Court held that the first three
conditions of the challenged regulation were evenhanded in light of
the overall regulatory scheme that Nebraska had created for ground-
water."' By doing so the court held that a state that imposes substan-
tially different burdens on in-state and out-of-state interests is not
necessarily discriminating against the out-of-state interests for pur-
poses of commerce clause analysis. 2
Applying the Pike test, the Sporhase court accorded presump-
tive validity to the actions taken by Nebraska to protect its re-
87. Id. at 944.
88. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
89. 458 U.S. at 957.
90. Id. at 955-56.
91. Id.
92. The New Jersey Supreme Court relied on the Sporhase court's analysis to uphold a
state court injunction that prohibited a New Jersey landfill from accepting solid waste gener-
ated in Pennsylvania and which imposed mandatory recycling responsibilities and other restric-
tions on the New Jersey communities that were authorized to send their solid waste to the
landfill. Borough of Glassboro v. Gloucester County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 100 N.J. 134,
495 A.2d 49 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1008 (1985). In interpreting Sporhase, the New
Jersey Supreme Court noted that the United States Supreme Court, in Sporhase, had held
Nebraska's water conservation program to be evenhanded under the Pike test because it im-
posed "burdens, albeit different ones, on in-state and out-of-state users." 495 A.2d at 57. The
New Jersey Supreme Court then held that the state court injunction being reviewed in Glass-
boro was evenhanded because it distributed burdens, albeit different ones, on the Pennsylvania
and New Jersey municipalities that had been disposing of solid waste at the landfill prior to
the injunction, id., and the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the state court injunction under
the Pike test. 495 A.2d at 59.
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sources. To support its holding, the Court explained that,
in the absence of a contrary view expressed by Congress, we
are reluctant to condemn as unreasonable, measures taken by a
state to conserve and preserve for its own citizens this vital re-
source in times of severe shortage . . . [A] state's power to reg-
ulate the use of water in times and places of shortage for the
purpose of protecting the health of its citizens-and not simply
the health of its economy-is at the core of its police power. For
Commerce Clause purposes, we have long recognized a differ-
ence between economic protectionism, on the one hand, and
health and safety regulation on the other. 3
The Court in Sporhase, however, struck down the fourth condi-
tion of the challenged statute, the reciprocity condition, because it
violated the commerce clause. 94 This action demonstrated the factors
considered when determining whether state regulation that affects
interstate commerce is discriminatory. Finding that the reciprocity
condition was discriminatory because it operated as an explicit bar-
rier to all commerce in groundwater between Colorado and Ne-
braska,95 the Court analyzed the reciprocity condition under the
strict City of Philadelphia test, rather than the Pike test. The
Sporhase decision is significant because it illustrates that the Su-
preme Court will look beyond the law being challenged and will ex-
plore the broader regulatory framework in which the law is set to
determine whether the law is discriminatory. Additionally, the case
is noteworthy because it holds that a state that imposes severe re-
strictions on its own citizens to protect its natural resources may im-
pose similar restrictions on out-of-state interests without an unconsti-
tutional violation of the commerce clause.
A final major Supreme Court decision, Maine v. Taylor,96 indi-
cates that even state regulations that discriminate against interstate
commerce may be upheld if they survive the heightened scrutiny es-
tablished in City of Philadelphia and Hughes. Maine v. Taylor in-
volved a challenge to a Maine statute that made it a crime to import
live bait fish into the state.9 7 Maine argued that the importation of
live baitfish would place its population of wild fish at risk.98 First,
the out-of-state fish might be infected with one or more of three
93. Id. at 956.
94. Id. at 958.
95. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982).
96. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
97. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7613 (1981).
98. 477 U.S. at 141.
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types of parasites prevalent outside of Maine, but not common to
Maine. Second, the imported fish would disturb Maine's aquatic
ecology by competing with Maine's fish for food, habitat, or by prey-
ing on native species. Third, imported fish would disrupt the environ-
ment in more subtle ways.99 Maine also argued that no satisfactory
way exited to inspect the shipments of live baitfish for the non-native
parasites. 100
The Court held that the Maine law was discriminatory and di-
rectly restricted interstate trade by blocking the importation of live
baitfish at the state's border. 101 Applying the strict scrutiny standard
of Hughes v. Oklahoma, the Court held that Maine's law served a
legitimate local purpose. Because nondiscriminatory alternatives
could not serve this purpose as well, the statute was held constitu-
tional.10 2 The Court distinguished the Maine statute from the statute
in City of Philadelphia, describing the statute in City of Philadel-
phia as an example of simple economic protectionism. 1 3 In fhe
Court's words:
The Commerce Clause significantly limits the ability of
states and localities to regulate or otherwise burden the flow of
interstate commerce, but it does not elevate free trade above all
other values. As long as a state does not needlessly obstruct in-
terstate trade or attempt "to place itself in a position of eco-
nomic isolation," . . . it retains broad regulatory authority to
protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of
its natural resources.'04
IV. Analysis of Executive Order 1989-8
A. Inherent Limitations
Several provisions of Executive Order 1989-8 may impact on
the interstate flow of solid waste. In particular, the temporary mora-
torium on the issuance of new permits for municipal waste landfills
or resource recovery facilities unless at least 70% of the waste to be
disposed of at the facility was generated in Pennsylvania, 0 5 the tem-
porary volume limitations for all municipal waste landfills, 06 and the
99. Id.
100. Id. at 141-42.
101. Id. at 137-38.
102. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986).
103. Id. at 148.
104. Id. at 151, citing Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935).
105. 4 PA. CODE § 7.471(a) (1990).
106. Id. § 7.472.
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temporary moratorium on new approvals for disposal of sewage
sludge in municipal waste landfills1"7 will probably place an inciden-
tal burden on the interstate flow of solid waste. A review of the pro-
visions under the Supreme Court's dormant commerce clause analy-
sis, however, demonstrates the constitutionality of the Executive
Order.
Two provisions of the Executive Order, the sewage sludge mora-
torium' and the volume limitations,"'9 are virtually unassailable
under a commerce clause analysis. Both of these restrictions apply
uniformly to all municipal waste landfills in Pennsylvania without
regard to the origin of the waste that is disposed of at the facility.
Because they are non-discriminatory in purpose and effect, the re-
strictions must be analyzed under the Pike test."' If the sewage
sludge moratorium and the waste volume limitations serve a legiti-
mate local public interest and do not impose a burden on interstate
commerce that is "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits,"' they must be upheld under the Pike test.
The limitations of Executive Order 1989-8 serve many public
health, safety, and environmental interests that constitute legitimate
local public interests. In particular, the limitations of Executive Or-
der 1989-8 are designed to reduce the threat to Pennsylvania's natu-
ral resources from landfill wastes and to eliminate landfill acreage
from other uses in perpetuity. The Order's limitations are also
designed to assure long-term municipal waste capacity to serve the
needs of the Commonwealth and to prevent unnecessary and uncon-
trolled risks to the health, safety, or welfare of the people of the
Commonwealth." 2
An analysis of Executive Order 1989-8 reveals that the burden
imposed on interstate commerce by the volume limitations and sew-
age sludge moratorium is not clearly excessive in relation to the pu-
tative local benefits. The volume limitations and the sewage sludge
moratorium are temporary measures that remain in effect only until
DER adopts a state-wide municipal waste management plan." 3 In
particular, the volume limitations required by the Executive Order
are based on the actual daily volume of waste disposed of at the
107. Id. § 7.471(b).
108. Id.
109. Id. § 7.472.
110. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
111. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
112. 19 Pa. Bull. 4598, 4599 (1989).
113. See 4 PA. CODE § 7.473 (1990). The Executive Order requires DER to prepare a
proposed statewide municipal waste management plan by September 26, 1991. Id.
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landfill."14
Additionally, the Executive Order provides for exemptions from
the volume limitations and sewage sludge moratorium, further mini-
mizing the impact of those limitations on interstate commerce. 1 '
For example, the Executive Order authorizes DER to allow munici-
pal waste landfills to accept volumes of waste greater than the vol-
ume limits established pursuant to the Executive Order in certain
situations.11 With respect to the sewage sludge moratorium, this ap-
plies only to new permit modifications for disposal of sewage
sludge. " 7 If a landfill is already authorized by permit to dispose of
sewage sludge, it may continue to accept sewage sludge in accor-
dance with the terms of its permit, modified by any volume limits
imposed pursuant to the Executive Order." 8 Therefore, the burdens
placed on interstate commerce by the volume limitations and sewage
sludge moratorium in the Executive Order cannot be said to be
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits of the limi-
tations. Since the volume limitations and sewage sludge moratorium
are evenhanded, serve a legitimate public interest, and do not impose
a burden on interstate commerce that is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits," 9 they satisfy the three requirements
of the Pike test. Those limitations, therefore, are constitutional exer-
cises of Pennsylvania's police power.
B. An Analysis of the 70% Limitation
Another limitation imposed by Executive Order 1989-8, the
70% limitation, also satisfies the requirements of the Pike test ' as
the Supreme Court applied the test in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel
Douglas. 2' As noted above, the Executive Order imposes a tempo-
rary moratorium on the issuance of new permits for municipal waste
landfills or resource recovery facilities unless at least 70% of the
waste to be disposed of at the facility was generated in Pennsylva-
nia.' 22 Initially, it appears that the 70% limitation imposed by the
Executive Order is a discriminatory measure because it seems to
treat waste generated within Pennsylvania differently than waste
114. Id. § 7.472(a).
115. Id. §§ 7.472(b)-(d).
116. Id.
117. Id. § 7.471(b).
118. 4 PA. CODE § 7.472(e).
119. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 394 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
120. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
121. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
122. 4 PA. CODE § 7.471(a).
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generated outside of Pennsylvania. 2 The Supreme Court, however,
indicated in Sporhase that regulating in-state and out-of-state inter-
ests differently is not necessarily discriminating against out-of-state
interests."' In analyzing the permit requirement for the transfer of
groundwater that applied only to transfers of groundwater out-of-
state, the Supreme Court examined Nebraska's entire regulatory
scheme for the transfer of groundwater. The Court noted that, "a
state that imposes severe withdrawal and use restrictions on its own
citizens is not discriminating against interstate commerce when it
seeks to prevent the uncontrolled transfer of water out of the state.' 25
The Court then weighed the burdens placed on in-state and out-of-
state interests by the state regulatory scheme to determine whether
the regulatory provision before the Court was discriminatory.
Pennsylvania already has stringent municipal waste planning,
minimization, and recycling requirements and a beneficial use and
reuse program for municipal and residual waste, all of which se-
verely limit the amount of Pennsylvania waste that can be disposed
of at Pennsylvania landfills or resource recovery facilities. The 70%
limitation in Executive Order 1989-8 places similar limitations on
the amount of waste generated outside of Pennsylvania that can be
disposed of in Pennsylvania. Since Pennsylvania places severe restric-
tions on the use of the Commonwealth's natural resources (land) for
its own citizens, it does not discriminate when it seeks to impose sim-
ilar restrictions on the use of those same natural resources by out-of-
state interests. In light of the Supreme Court's analysis in
Sporhase, 26 the 70% limitation is an evenhanded, non-discrimina-
tory measure that satisfies the first requirement of the Pike test.
The 70% limitation of the Executive Order also satisfies the
second requirement of the Pike test. That is, it serves numerous le-
gitimate local public interests (including protection of the Common-
wealth's natural resources), provides assurance of long-term munici-
pal waste disposal capacity in Pennsylvania, and protects public
health, safety, and welfare. 127 These are the same reasons why the
sewage sludge moratorium and volume limitation satisfied the second
123. It may be argued that the 70% requirement of 4 PA. CODE § 7.471(a) discrimi-
nates against waste generated outside of the Commonwealth because the measure limits the
amount of waste generated outside of the Commonwealth that may be disposed of in certain
landfills and does not place similar limits on the amount of waste generated within the Com-
monwealth that may be disposed of in those landfills.
124. 458 U.S. at 955-56.
125. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 955-56.
126. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
127. 19 Pa. Bull. 4598, 4599 (1989).
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requirement of the Pike test.
Finally, the 70% limitation of Executive Order 1989-8 places
an incidental burden on interstate commerce that is not clearly ex-
cessive in relation to the local benefits of the limitation. Therefore,
the 70% limitation meets the third requirement under Pike. Statis-
tics compiled by DER at the time of the Executive Order indicated
that 30% of the municipal waste that was disposed of in Pennsylva-
nia was generated outside of Pennsylvania, while 70% of the waste
was generated within Pennsylvania. 28 Requiring certain facilities to
demonstrate that 70% of the municipal waste that will be received
at the facility is generated within Pennsylvania before the issuance
of a new municipal waste permit, therefore, does little more than
stabilize the volume of out-of-state waste that is disposed of in those
facilities. This stabilized level is equal to the percentage of out-of-
state waste that was disposed of in Pennsylvania at the time of the
Executive Order. Furthermore, under the terms of the Executive Or-
der, the moratorium on permit issuances is a temporary moratorium
and will last only until DER has adopted a statewide municipal
waste management plan.
In summary, because the 70% limitation of the Executive Or-
der is evenhanded, serves a legitimate local purpose, and places an
incidental burden on interstate commerce that is not clearly exces-
sive in relation to the putative local benefits of the limitation, it satis-
fies the three requirements of the Pike test.
I. Heightened Scrutiny.-The Pike test is the proper analysis
to be used by a court when reviewing the 70% limitation in Execu-
tive Order 1989-8. This limitation, however, could withstand even
the heightened scrutiny test outlined by the Supreme Court in City
of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, Hughes v. Oklahoma, and Maine v.
Taylor. The Supreme Court distinguished state regulation of inter-
state trade that encourages economic isolation from state regulation
that protects the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of
its natural resources. The Court held that the latter form of regula-
tion is constitutionally valid while the former is not. 2 ' For example,
in City of Philadelphia, New Jersey's statute created economic iso-
lation by completely banning the importation of solid waste into the
state. Specifically, the statute "impos[ed] on out-of-state interests
128. Id.
129. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986).
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the full burden of conserving the state's remaining landfill space." ' 0
As a result, the statute was struck down. The 70% limitation of the
Order, however, does not place Pennsylvania in a position of eco-
nomic isolation, but instead protects the health and safety of the citi-
zens of Pennsylvania while placing an incidental burden on interstate
commerce. Therefore, under this analysis, the statute is constitution-
ally valid.
A court will not review state regulation of interstate commerce
under the heightened scrutiny of City of Philadelphia and its prog-
eny unless the challenger shows that the state regulation discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce. If a challenger could satisfy this
burden with regard to the 70% limitation of Executive Order 1989-
8, the limitation would be unconstitutional only if there existed no
legitimate purpose for the limitation, or if the legitimate purpose for
the limitation could be achieved by other available nondiscrimina-
tory alternatives. There are numerous legitimate purposes for the
70% limitation of the Executive Order. Those purposes, however,
cannot be achieved by available nondiscriminatory means."' 1 The
70% limitation is, therefore, a constitutional exercise of Pennsylva-
nia's police power under the heightened scrutiny of City of Philadel-
phia and its progeny.
2. Assuring Disposal Capacity.-ln order to protect public
health and safety and to avoid the problems caused by the illegal
disposal of solid waste within the Commonwealth, Pennsylvania
must ensure that it has sufficient disposal capacity to provide for the
needs of its own citizens. At the same time, however, solid waste
disposal creates numerous public health and safety hazards and pre-
vents land in Pennsylvania from being put to more productive uses in
perpetuity. For this reason, it is important to reduce the total volume
of solid waste disposed of in Pennsylvania. The goals of the 70%
limitation of Executive Order 1989-8 are intended to provide for suf-
ficient municipal waste disposal capacity in Pennsylvania for its citi-
zens and to reduce the total volume of waste disposal of the state.
No adequate nondiscriminatory alternatives to the 70% limita-
tion exist that would achieve its legitimate goals. The root of the
problem addressed by the 70% limitation is the volume of solid
waste disposed of in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania has the ability to
130. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978).
131. For purposes of analysis only, the remainder of this article assumes that a challenge
to the Executive Order has satisfied the burden of showing that the 70% limitation of the
Executive Order discriminates against interstate commerce.
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severely limit the amount of waste generated within Pennsylvania
and disposed of in Pennsylvania. The state cannot, however, limit the
total amount of waste disposed of in Pennsylvania and provide ade-
quate disposal capacity for the waste generated within Pennsylvania
without imposing some direct limitations on the amount of imported
waste that may be disposed of in Pennsylvania.
Simply limiting the total volume of waste that may be disposed
of in Pennsylvania without limiting the volume of waste generated
out-of-state that may be disposed of in Pennsylvania would not
achieve the goals of the 70% limitation. Although such a limitation
would reduce the total volume of waste disposed of in Pennsylvania,
it would not guarantee sufficient disposal capacity in Pennsylvania
for the waste generated within the Commonwealth. Furthermore, the
decrease in the amount of disposal capacity in Pennsylvania created
by such a limitation would lead to higher prices for disposal in Penn-
sylvania and more competition for the limited amount of disposal
space. These increased costs and competition could encourage illegal
disposal activity within the Commonwealth, endangering public
health and safety.
No nondiscriminatory alternative could achieve the legitimate
public health and safety goals of the 70% limitation. Although the
limitation may be challenged as discriminatory, it is clearly the least
discriminatory alternative available to achieve those goals. It is a
temporary limitation applying only to new facilities and merely re-
quiring that the percentage of waste generated outside of Pennsylva-
nia to be disposed of within the state be limited to the percentage of
waste generated outside of Pennsylvania already being disposed of in
landfills and resource recovery facilities across the Commonwealth at
the time the Executive Order was issued. This burden on interstate
commerce is incidental. For the reasons set forth in this Article, the
70% limitation is constitutional under each of the commerce clause
tests established by the Supreme Court.
VI. Conclusion
In the decade or so following the Supreme Court's decision in
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the lower federal courts have
been reluctant to validate state efforts to slow the interstate flow of
solid waste if the state efforts are not one of the two types of state
action discussed by the City of Philadelphia Court in footnote six of
the opinion. In short, the lower federal courts have approved state
programs that involve the state as a market participant and state
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programs that place identical burdens on waste generated out of
state and at least some waste generated in the state, but have been
reluctant to approve any other types of state programs.
Although the lower federal courts are reluctant to approve state
actions other than the two types of schemes discussed in the City of
Philadelphia footnote, the Supreme Court's dormant commerce
clause analysis has evolved substantially since that case was decided.
Hughes v. Oklahoma and Maine v. Taylor have taught legal ana-
lysts that the City of Philadelphia's per se rule of invalidity for dis-
criminatory state statutes is not necessarily a per se rule after all,
and Sporhase ex rel. Douglas v. Nebraska has illustrated that it is
no longer a simple task to determine what constitutes a discrimina-
tory state statute.
Although the Supreme Court has not revisited the issue of the
conflict between state regulation of solid waste flow and the dormant
commerce clause since City of Philadelphia, the Court has refined
its dormant commerce clause analysis since that decision so that a
wider variety of state regulatory schemes may theoretically be justi-
fied under the refined analysis as opposed to the two types of
schemes discussed in the City of Philadelphia footnote. In that vein,
Executive Order 1989-8 demonstrates that, under the Supreme
Court's refined commerce clause analysis, states have the ability to
constitutionally regulate solid waste management in an effort to con-
serve natural resources and protect public health, safety, and the en-
vironment in ways that go beyond the limited spectrum suggested in
City of Philadelphia.
